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Epilogue: Autonomy as Privilege 
Barbara J. Flagg  
Privilege Revealed reflects a paradigm shift in American 
jurisprudence, from a conception of law and society built upon the 
classical liberal notion of unfettered individualism to an 
understanding based on the ways differential burdens and advantages 
impact individuals’ lives and thus ought to play a role in the 
development and implementation of the law. At first, this may appear 
to be a case of competing conceptual frameworks—one constructed 
around a notion of the individual actor abstracted from any social 
circumstances, the other taking social context to be central to any and 
every analysis. But I would like to suggest that this is not a 
competition in which equilibrium has been reached. Taking privilege 
seriously, as Privilege Revealed urges us to do, leads to the 
conclusion that classical liberal autonomy simply does not exist, and 
therefore, no just legal system can be built upon that foundation. In 
this Epilogue, I sketch the outlines of that argument. 
“Privilege” is an unusual term in that it’s clearly relational but has 
no obvious converse. Privilege Revealed accepts a definition set forth 
in the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language: “a 
special advantage, immunity, permission, right, or benefit granted to 
or enjoyed by an individual, class, or caste.”1 Because positions of 
privilege are “special,” one might infer that there is some implied 
position of neutrality or normality against which privilege should be 
measured. Of course, identifying such positions is not the objective of 
 
  Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. I think I may have been 
afforded the honor of having the last word in this symposium because I can claim a connection 
with three of the four authors of Privilege Revealed. Though I never knew Trina Grillo, I have 
enjoyed the friendship of Stephanie Wildman for nearly two decades. Margalynne Armstrong 
was once my “boss” when she was Director of Academic Support at Boalt Hall School of Law 
and I was a student tutor in that program. And I now have the pleasure of naming Adrienne 
Davis as a colleague at Washington University. 
 1. STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE 
UNDERMINES AMERICA 13 (1996). 
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Privilege Revealed, but there is a sort of “normality shift” at work. 
The book seeks to displace a discourse in which positions of relative 
advantage are themselves normalized: “The characteristics and 
attributes of those who are privileged group members are described 
as societal norms—as the way things are and as what is normal in 
society. . . . The privileged characteristic is the norm; those who stand 
outside are the aberrant or ‘alternative.’”2 Making systems of 
privilege visible disrupts that process of normalization and so fosters 
more just assessments, legal and otherwise, of social processes and 
the individual acts that take place within them. 
Privilege Revealed has made an enduring contribution to the 
project of making specific systems of privilege visible. One could 
name any of the book’s chapters as exemplars, but for present 
purposes, I’d highlight “Privilege in the Workplace: The Missing 
Element in Antidiscrimination Law”3 and “Privilege in Residential 
Housing.”4 The former looks at ways workplace norms, expectations, 
and practices are built upon unstated male models and so operate to 
disadvantage women. The latter examines the operation of race 
privilege and economic privilege in constructing and maintaining 
patterns of residential housing segregation. The work continues in the 
present symposium: Professor Hart takes a look at bargaining power 
privilege in contract negotiations,
5
 and Professor Ikemoto examines 
what she terms “BioPrivilege”—differential access to various 
dimensions of medical care.
6
 
I select these examples because they show that systems of 
privilege affect both what happens to the individual—matters entirely 
outside her control—and the choices she can or cannot make—
matters often thought to be within her control. Of course, those 
aspects of life are intertwined—the circumstances in which one acts 
affects the choices one can make, and at least some of the time, the 
 
 2. Id. at 14. 
 3. Id. at 25–41. 
 4. Id. at 43–65. 
 5. Danielle Kie Hart, Revealing Privilege—Why Bother?, 42 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
131 (2013). 
 6. Lisa C. Ikemoto, BioPrivilege, 42 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 74–76 (2013). Again, 
these examples are not exhaustive. 
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choices one makes can affect one’s larger circumstances.7 But 
whether one considers them jointly or separately, making privilege 
visible sheds light on both agency and person-as-object, in the sense 
that one can be a passive recipient or target of external acts and 
events. Privilege analysis is not merely (as if “merely” was the 
appropriate term here) a structural perspective; it reaches human 
agency itself. 
Consider John Stuart Mill’s classic formulation:  
[T]he appropriate region of human liberty . . . comprises, first, 
the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of 
conscience in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought 
and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all 
subjects . . . Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes 
and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own 
character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as 
may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so 
long as what we do does not harm them, even though they 
should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, 
from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within 
the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to 
unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the 
persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not 
forced or deceived.
8
 
Mill’s subsequent discussion focuses on the obligation of government 
not to interfere with individual liberty so defined, though also 
recognizing that government does have a role in preventing 
interference by others.
9
 Throughout, his description of liberty clearly 
assumes an underlying, absolute human agency: the individual has a 
pre-social capacity to identify his own “tastes and pursuits” and “plan 
of life” and to act upon them if not interfered with through the 
(intentional) acts of government or other individuals.  
 
 7. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney-López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations 
on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 8. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 17–18 (Gateway 1955) (1859). 
 9. See id. at 109–37. 
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One contrast with privilege analysis is immediately apparent: 
there is no place in Mill’s scheme for the burdens and constraints on 
individual choice imposed by social structures that are the product of 
neither governmental nor other individuals’ actions. For example, the 
work of caring for others in the workplace is a burden more likely to 
be imposed on women than on men because of broader social 
conceptions of gender, and thus, a woman worker may have a longer 
and more disparate list of tasks to perform than would a male hired to 
fill the same position.
10
 Women are disadvantaged in the realm of 
medical care by the normalization of the male body.
11
 Along similar 
lines, a person of color demonstrably does not have unfettered 
freedom of choice in selecting where to live.
12
 Privilege analysis 
illuminates the ways in which social structures—the absence of 
privilege—operate to limit one’s ability to “frame one’s life plan”; 
Mill’s approach does not. 
But, one might argue, that really is just a matter of inappropriate 
social norms. If we did not construct the normative world on a male 
model or assume that whiteness includes an entitlement to white 
homogeneity in residential neighborhoods, we would not see the 
scenarios just described. Women would have the same opportunities 
as men in the workplace and in medical care, and people of color 
would have the same housing options as do whites. I suggest that this 
is the point at which it appears that we have competing paradigms for 
law—should we proceed on the assumption of perfect Millsian 
autonomy or the premises of imperfect social structures of hierarchy 
and privilege? But I also suggest that the picture is not yet complete, 
in that privilege does not involve solely the absence of burdens and 
constraints. As Martha Fineman has pointed out, autonomy often 
requires subsidy. 
Fineman associates ideals of independence and self-sufficiency 
with the notion of autonomy.
13
 She makes a very persuasive case that, 
as she defines those concepts, we do not structure legal policy in such 
 
 10. WILDMAN, supra note 1, at 3. 
 11. Ikemoto, supra note 6, at 71–76. 
 12. See generally Haney-López, supra note 7, at 48–50. 
 13. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 
7 (2004). 
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a way as to foster or reward independence; rather, we are “a nation 
where some individuals are subsidized and supported in their 
‘independence’ while others are left mired in their poverty or 
burdened by responsibilities not equitably shared.”14 Fineman’s focus 
is on the ways autonomy conflicts with equality ideals, which is not 
central here. But the insight that independence requires subsidy, that 
very few if any individuals are truly self-sufficient, is quite to the 
point. For example, men are not merely unconstrained in the 
workplace by models that assume no responsibility for childcare—
they are affirmatively subsidized by the care work of others (usually 
women). Whites do not simply have unfettered choice in regard to 
housing; we also enjoy racially differential access to mortgage 
lending, a prerequisite for home ownership, and so are subsidized in 
our choices by those institutional arrangements. As Professor Hart 
notes, “subprime mortgage loans—an integral part of the Great 
Recession—were predominantly made to younger, single, or 
divorced women of color living in minority neighborhoods.”15 The 
industry in effect subsidizes white mortgagees. 
One can elaborate this analysis almost endlessly. The point is that 
privilege often is exactly what the dictionary definition says it is: a 
special set of advantages not enjoyed by others. That is, it is an 
affirmative benefit and not only the absence of burdens and 
constraints. And if autonomy often (always?) requires subsidy—the 
work of others, in one form or another—then what remains of the 
notion of independence? In reality, for human beings there is no such 
thing; we are all interdependent. Exploration of privilege exposes the 
ways in which interdependence flows (justly and unjustly), and it 
obliterates the ideology of abstract autonomy. Such autonomy is 
privilege.  
 
 14. Id. at 3. 
 15. Hart, supra note 5, at 143. 
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